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MCCOY V. FEINMAN, ET.AL. 1
(decided November 19, 2002)
I. SYNOPSIS
In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals up-
held a decision by the appellate division 2 dismissing an attorney
malpractice action as time barred.3 The court found that the stat-
ute of limitations in the plaintiff's negligence action against her for-
mer divorce attorney for failure to secure a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order (QDRO) began to run when the divorce stipula-
tion or judgment was entered. 4 The negligence action was, there-




In 1969, Susan McCoy married her former husband. 6 Under
his employee benefit plan, a surviving spouse is eligible to receive
either retirement benefits or survivorship benefits if the husband
dies prior to retirement. 7 The McCoy's separated in 1985 and Su-
san McCoy hired defendant Kenneth Feinman to represent her in
the divorce.8 On June 23, 1987, the parties entered an oral stipula-
tion of settlement, agreeing that Susan McCoy would receive a per-
centage of her former husband's pension plan, the details of which
would be outlined in the QDRO that Feinman's office would pre-
pare and submit either "simultaneously with or shortly after the
judgment of divorce."9 Although Feinman also agreed to submit
the judgment of divorce, "he never prepared either the QDRO or
1. 99 N.Y.2d 295 (2002).
2. McCoy v. Feinman, 737 N.Y.S.2d 481 (App. Div. 2002).
3. Id. at 482.





9. Id. at 299.
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the judgment".10 OnJune 14, 1988, the husband's attorney submit-
ted the final judgment of divorce, which incorporated the prior
oral stipulation, with the county clerk's office.11
Feinman's final representation of McCoy took place when he
represented her in a support action against her ex-husband in fam-
ily court that was entered on July 24, 1991.12 McCoy did not contact
Feinman again until September 1994, when her ex-husband died
prior to his retirement. 13 For the next year, Feinman and his law
firm tried to secure pre-retirement death benefits for the plaintiff
pursuant to her ex-husband's employee benefit plan; however, the
efforts were unsuccessful. 14 During this time, the plaintiff was una-
ware that Feinman failed to secure the QDRO. 15 Ultimately, the
plan administrator determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to
pre-retirement death benefits under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) because there was no QDRO naming
the plaintiff as surviving spouse under the benefit plan.
16
On January 9, 1996, Feinman advised McCoy that he was una-
ble to obtain the pre-retirement death benefits for her; therefore,
the firm would be closing her file. 17 On June 12, 1996, the plaintiff
instituted a legal malpractice action against Feinman and his law
firm for failure to secure pre-retirement death benefits for her. 18
The plaintiff argued that Feinman negligently failed to submit the
QDRO and that this negligent act resulted in her failure to obtain
the pre-retirement death benefits. 19
The supreme court order entered September 8, 2000 granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the mal-
practice action as time barred by expiration of the three-year statute
of limitations. 2
0






16. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 299.
17. Id. at 299-300.
18. Id. at 300.
19. Id.
20. McCoy, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
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In a 3-2 decision, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
affirmed the supreme court order granting the defendant's motion
for summary judgment.21 The majority determined that the statute
of limitations on the malpractice claim began on June 14, 1988,
when the divorce judgment was entered without the QDRO. The
court held that from that date the plaintiff was no longer consid-
ered a surviving spouse for purposes of receiving benefits under the
plan.
22
The plaintiff appealed as of right pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L.R.
§ 5601 (a).23 Adopting the reasoning of the dissenters in the appel-
late division, the plaintiff called for a reversal of the lower court's
decision. The dissenters argued that the statute of limitations did
not begin until the husband's death on September 1, 1994.24 They
contended that the plaintiff would be unable to assess any actual
damages caused by defendant's negligence until this time. 25 In ad-
dition, the dissenters called for the application of the doctrine of
continuous representation 26 and the reversal of the Supreme Court
order on these grounds.
27
III. DiscussiON
The court of appeals first looked to the applicable time limita-
tions for attorney malpractice claims, noting that this was the key
issue on appeal. Although Feinman conceded that he was negli-
gent in representing the plaintiff in her divorce, the parties dis-
agreed as to which acts caused plaintiff to sustain injury and when
the injury occurred. 28
21. McCoy, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
22. Id.
23. N.Y.C.P.L.R. 5601 (a) gives the appealing party a right to appeal to the court of
appeals when at least two justices dissent on a question of law (McKinney 1995).
24. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 300.
25. Id.
26. See Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 N.Y.2d 164, 167-68 (2001) (explaining that the
continuous representation doctrine "'recognizes that a person seeking professional as-
sistance has a right to repose confidence in the professional's ability and good faith,
and realistically cannot be expected to question and assess techniques employed or the
manner in which the services are rendered'") (citing Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86,
94 (1982)).
27. McCoy, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
28. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 302.
2003]
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To resolve these disputes, the court looked to both the statu-
tory and common law governing stipulations, domestic orders and
employee benefit plans. 29 The court determined that the defen-
dant's negligence occurred when he entered a defective stipulation
and final divorce decree and therefore, the statute of limitation be-
gan on eitherJune 23, 1987 orJune 14, 1988. Thus, the malprac-
tice claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
30
A. Statute of Limitations
As a general rule, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 203(a) states that the time in
which a plaintiff can commence an action is to be determined from
"the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is inter-
posed."31 The legislature explicitly states that a court does not have
the discretion to extend a statute of limitations period.
32
Attorney malpractice claims must be commenced within three-
years. 33 A legal malpractice claim accrues when "'all the facts nec-
essary to the cause of action have occurred and the injured party
can obtain relief in court."' 34 Although the court of appeals recog-
nized an exception to the tolling of the three-year statute of limita-
tions under the doctrine of continuous representation,35 there is
no exception to measuring an attorney malpractice claim from the
date the injury was caused by the malpractice.
3 6
Feinman conceded that he was negligent in the representation
of the plaintiff during her divorce action. 37 However, the parties
disagreed as to which of Feinman's negligent acts caused the plain-
tiffs injuries and at which time those negligent acts became action-
able.38 The court looked to the law governing stipulations and
employee benefit plans to determine these issues.3 9 It is from this
29. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 302.
30. Id. at 305-06.
31. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 203(a)(2003).
32. See id. § 201.
33. See id. § 214 (6).
34. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 301 (citing Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 84 N.Y.2d 535,
541 (1984)).
35. See Shumsky at 167-68.
36. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 301.





analysis that the court then determined when the statute of limita-
tions in this case began to accrue. 40
B. Stipulations
The court noted that stipulations serve several purposes, in-
cluding predictability and assurance that courts will honor such
agreements. 41 They also promote judicial economy by narrowing
the scope of issues for appeal. 42 The court also noted that binding
stipulations are contracts and are to be governed by contract law.
43
Therefore, stipulations will be upheld unless they are the product
of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, unconscionability or any other
mechanism that renders a contract invalid. 44
The court first looked to the oral stipulation entered by the
defendant on June 23, 1987 while representing the plaintiff in her
divorce settlement. The agreement stated that the plaintiff would
receive a portion of retirement benefits vested in the plan prior to the
divorce. 45 However, the stipulation was silent as to whether the
plaintiff would receive pre-retirement death benefits. 46
The court held that the stipulation was not ambiguous; it sim-
ply did not cover pre-retirement death benefits. 47 The court also
found that the final judgment of divorce did not cover pre-retire-
ment death benefits; it simply incorporated the oral stipulation into
the judgment.48 As a result, the court held that plaintiff was not
entitled to pre-retirement death benefits under the oral
stipulation. 4
9





45. Id. at 303 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff relies on Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61
N.Y.2d 481, 485 (1984) for formula to determine equitable distribution of benefits to
ex-spouse pursuant to employee benefit plan.
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C. Domestic Relations Orders And Employee Benefit Plans
The employee benefit plan in this case is subject to ERISA,
5 0
which states that a divorce judgment terminates a spouse's right to
be deemed a surviving spouse under an ex-spouse's employee bene-
fit plan.51 Under ERISA, an administrator is prohibited from as-
signing plan benefits unless, pursuant to a QDRO, the ex-spouse is
designated "surviving spouse" for purposes of inheriting from the
plan.52 A QDRO obtained pursuant to a settlement can only convey
those rights already stipulated to by the parties as a basis for the
judgment.
53
The plaintiff asserted that she suffered an actionable injury
due to Feinman's continuous failure to secure the QDRO. 54 How-
ever, the court determined that the stipulation did not confer pre-
retirement death benefits to the plaintiff.55 Since the QDRO can-
not convey a right that was not previously stipulated to, the court
held that the plaintiff suffered no actionable injury from defen-
dant's failure to secure the QDRO.
56
D. Analysis
Since both the plaintiff and defendant concede that Feinman
was negligent in his representation of the plaintiff, the only issue
for the court of appeals to determine was when the negligent action
took place and when the plaintiff suffered actionable harm.
57
The court concluded that it was the defendant's failure to se-
cure pre-retirement death benefits in the stipulation andjudgment
that caused the plaintiff's actual injury.51 It was from this point that
the plaintiff was not entitled to receive pre-retirement death bene-
fits. 59 Since the QDRO cannot assign a right that was not previously
50. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 304 n.3 (explaining that ERISA is a federal statute de-
signed to protect the interests of employees and their beneficiaries).




55. Id. at 303.
56. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 305.





stipulated to, the plaintiff did not suffer actionable injury from the
defendant's continuous failure to secure the QDRO.
60
Instead, it was the defendant's failure to include pre-retire-
ment death benefits in the stipulation and judgment that caused
the plaintiff's actionable injury.61 Therefore, the court held that
the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's negligence action against
defendant began to run on either June 23, 1987 (the date the stipu-
lation was entered), or at the latest, June 14, 1988 (the date the
judgment incorporating the stipulation was entered with the county
clerk) .62 In either case, the three-year statute of limitations for at-
torney malpractice actions expired 5 or 6 years prior to the institu-
tion of the malpractice claim against the defendant.
63
Finally, the plaintiff attempts to assert that under the continu-
ous representation doctrine set forth in Shumsky v. Eisenstein,64 the
statute of limitations did not begin until the defendant closed the
plaintiff's file on January 9, 1996.65 In Shumsky, the court held that
the continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limita-
tions only in circumstances where there is a mutual understanding
that additional representation may be needed on the specific sub-
ject matter at issue in the malpractice claim. 66
The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument, holding that
the malpractice occurred when the defendant failed to secure pre-
retirement death benefits in the stipulation or divorce judgment.67
The defendant did not represent the plaintiff in this specific subject
matter; therefore, the continuous representation doctrine did not
apply to this case. 6
8
IV. CONCLUSION
In McCoy v. Feinman, the New York State Court of Appeals held
that the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations in an at-




64. 96 N.Y.2d 164, 167-68 (2001).
65. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 302.
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torney malpractice action barred the plaintiff's negligence claim
against the defendant attorney. 69 The court held that the underly-
ing negligent act occurred 5 or 6 years prior to institution of the
action when the defendant failed to include pre-retirement death
benefits in the stipulation and judgment securing the plaintiff's di-
vorce.70 As such, the statute of limitations began to toll from that




69. McCoy, 99 N.Y.2d at 302.
70. Id. at 306.
71. Id.
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